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On Mars:
Exploration of the Red Planet. 1958-1978
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- SAFE HAVENS: SELECTING LANDING
SITES FOR VIKING
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- [277] Since the basic goal of Viking
was to conduct scientific experiments on the surface of Mars, the
selection of landing sites was recognized early as a topic of
major importance. Once the decision was made in November- December
1968 to make a soft landing from Mars orbit, the project engineers
and scientists began a long colloquy in which they weighed the
demands for lander safety (a crashed lander equaled no science)
against the desire to land at locations most attractive
scientifically. At first, the discussions were necessarily general
in tone; the scientific knowledge (in terms of both physical data
and visual images) was still very limited. Mariner 4 , flying by
the planet in July 1965, had yielded new information and the first
extraterrestrial images, revealing a heavily cratered, moonlike
surface. From Mariner 4
's perspective, the planet
appeared to have eroded very little. Some scientists concluded
that this meant there had not been much wind or water activity on
the surface. Other scientists pointed out that Mariner 4 had
sampled only l percent of the Martian surface; they wanted to see
the other 99 percent, and they wanted to see it more
closely.
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- The Viking Project Science Steering Group
began to consider the interplay between landing sites and Viking
lander science during its first meeting in February 1969.
Mariner 4 had raised as many questions as it had answered,
and data from Mariner 69 (Mariner 6
and 7 ), soon to be
launched, would not be available until next year. Donald G. Rea,
deputy director of planetary programs in the Office of Space
Science at NASA Headquarters, during this first Science Steering
Group meeting raised the landing site question when he asked for
thoughts on how best to use the orbiter in support of the landed
science program. Thomas Mutch, a geologist, began the discussion.
The lander imaging team he headed had not considered landing site
selection, since members thought orbital images were of little
value in the site selection process. They assumed that orbital
photographs would not be able to pick up geological features
smaller than a football stadium (i.e., resolutions in the 100- to
1000-meter range). Ground-based scientists could not possibly see
the lander or smaller scale hazards that could affect its safety,
and Mutch's team did not believe that orbital pictures would help
them pick either a good science site or a good landing
spot.1
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- [278] Wolf Vishniac of the biology
team disagreed. Orbiter imaging could provide a valuable means for
differentiating between places of low and high biological
potential. He also believed that a possible strategy for selecting
a landing site might be to set one craft down in a dark area and
the other in a light area. The difference between Mutch's
evaluation and that expressed by Vishniac was in itself
illuminating. Mutch was thinking in, terms of the small-scale
features (measured in centimeters) that the lander would be able
to see. Vishniac was basing his comments on the large-scale light
and dark features observed through Earth-based telescopes. Between
these two scales lay an unknown range of Martian topographical
features that would mean the difference between a safe landing and
a crash.
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- The second steering group meeting, at
Stanford University a month later, heard additional possibilities
for using orbiter imaging in selecting a landing zone. On the
large scale, Seymour Hess, the Viking meteorologist, expressed the
hope that the orbiter could find a large, flat area on which the
lander could he placed, so his weather station would function more
effectively. He preferred a place with no surface "relief for 10's
to 100's of kilometers." Surely the orbiter images could spot such
a tableland. But Klaus Biemann, a chemist from MIT, noted that in
the search for life forms, as well as in the molecular analysis
his team would make, it was preferable that the first lander sit
down in a warm, wet, low site. His ideal site demanded the fewest
degrees below freezing, the highest traces of water in whatever
form it might be found, and the highest atmospheric pressure
(i.e., the lowest elevation) possible; life would most likely
survive under those conditions.
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- In addition to the imaging system, the
Water-vapor mapping and thermal mapping experiments being planned
would give the Viking team clues to the best sites while the
lander was still attached to the orbiter, but the exact role of
the orbiter would become clear only with time. Defining the
mission occupied the Science Steering Group for the remainder of
1969 and most of 1970. 2 By August 1970, Jim Martin believed "that the
definition of Viking landing site characteristics, the definition
of data and data analysis needed to support the selection of
sites, and the integration of engineering....capabilities and
constraints" should be more coordinated. 3 A. Thomas Young, Viking Program Office science
integration manager, led a landing site working
group,* which met for the first time as a body at MIT on 2
September 1970. Martin opened the proceedings, indicating that
"the actual Viking landing sites would be selected through this
group."
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- C. Howard Robins, Jr., deputy mission
analysis and design manager, reminded the group that the Viking
system requirements were not being developed for a single ideal
mission. Instead, his teams were planning for a [279] broad
spectrum of missions based on the desire to set the lander down
anywhere in the latitude band 30° south. The hypothetical
landing sites being used to develop the "preliminary reference
mission" had not been selected for their scientific merit. They
had been chosen simply to give the analysis and design specialists
something to work with in creating spacecraft design requirements.
Finally, he reported that his office would develop the
"operational mission design," which would guide the conduct of the
real missions, by working hand in hand with the landing site
working group.
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- The working group members began to discuss
the desirable features and characteristics of Viking landing sites
with Tom Voting suggesting that initially they ignore any
potential system or mission constrains. Carl Sagan led off the
brainstorming session considering the problem in terms of three
primary areas of investigation-biology, geology, and meteorology.
Comments on biology centered on the availability of water,
atmospheric and surface temperatures, and ultraviolet radiation.
Each of these three variables could affect the possibility of
finding life forms.
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- The meteorologists wished to observe four
related phenomena over a period of time-seasonal darkening, the
daily night-day cycle, long-term meteorological variations, and
the annual polar-cap regression process. They also hoped the
lander could be in a position to observe dust devils, ground fog,
and ice clouds. William Baum of the Lowell Observatory's Planetary
Research Center presented a status report on Earth-based motion
studies of clouds on Mars. Cloud patterns were being mapped under
the International Planetary Patrol Programs hourly each day, and
recent daily photographs had shown significant changes, but he
could not say how these alterations might be correlated with
seasonal or other patterns.
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- The first working group meeting closed
with a discussion of the relationship between the Mariner 71
mission (Mariner 9, launched 8 May 1971) and Viking. Dan Schneiderman,
Mariner 71 project manager. hoped Viking personnel members would
participate in that mission as observers during the first 100 days
and thereafter as users of the orbital cameras to look for
potential Viking landing sites. Martin assured the working group
members that they would have an opportunity in October to discuss
topics of common interest between Mariner 71 and Viking.
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* Other members
of the working group were C. H. Robins and G. A. Soffen, Langley
Research Center; W. A. Baum, Lowell Observatory; A. Binder,
Science Applications Institute; G. A. Briggs and C. B. Farmer,
JPL; H. Kieffer, University of California at Los Angeles; J.
Lederberg, Stanford University; H. Masursky and H. J. Moore, U. S.
Geological Survey; and C. Sagan, Cornell University.
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