[185] The summer of 1969 was a time for
triumph and despair. Apollo 11
landed on the moon in July, but at
almost the same time NASA's budget was cut severely. Despite being
an enthusiastic supporter of the Viking project and wanting to
pursue an aggressive program of unmanned planetary exploration,
Thomas O. Paine, appointed administrator in March, began to preach
fiscal restraint to the Viking managers as early as June 1969. He
told John Naugle, his associate administrator for space science
and applications, that Viking and the other advanced planetary
projects would have to be managed wisely because NASA was living
in an era of great pressures to reduce the budget. The space
agency's expenditures were being subjected to considerable public
scrutiny and debate. 50
Paine's worries were well founded. When
the House Committee on Appropriations reported 19 June on the NASA
budget request, the projected fiscal 1970 funds were nearly $300
million less than the previous year. [186] Five days later, the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences recommended a
further reduction of $250 million. Late in July, Paine talked with
President Richard M. Nixon about the space program as they flew to
the Pacific splashdown site of Apollo 11 . The
president said that he personally was very enthusiastic about
American space activities, but his administration could not direct
large amounts of resources to the space program until the war in
Vietnam had been ended. Nixon was reflecting the budget-cutting
mood of Congress and the lack of public support for new space
initiatives. Reactions to the report of the president's Space Task
Group also affirmed the need for a fiscally responsible space
program. 51
To develop goals for the post-Apollo
period, President Nixon had appointed a special Space Task
Group* in February 1969. Although acknowledging that a new
rationale for the American space program had to be sought -
competition with the Soviet Union was no longer a realistic
justification for NASA's activities-the task group rejected the
idea that a manned mission to Mars in the 1980s should be the next
great challenge accepted by the United States. The negative
responses made on Capitol Hill and in the press to the manned Mars
goal reinforced the group's decision. A July 1969 Gallup Poll, for
instance, found 39 percent of 1517 persons polled nationally
favored attempts to land a man on Mars; 53 percent opposed. Of the
21- to 29-year-olds, 54 percent favored the project and 41 percent
opposed, but 60 percent of those over 50 opposed.
52
As delivered to President Nixon on 15
September, the Space Task Group's report, The Post-Apollo space Program: Directions for the
Future , had backed away from an
early manned landing on the Red Planet. The focus for the next
decades in space was on the development of hardware and systems
that would ultimately support a manned mission to Mars at the
close of the 20th century. After a presidential briefing on the
report, Nixon's press secretary said that the president agreed
with the group's rejection of an overly ambitious program aimed at
an early landing on another planet but also with its refusal to
propose a program that would terminate all manned space activities
in the post-Apollo years.53 Six months were to pass before President Nixon
personally reacted to the task group's findings, and by that time
Congress, through the appropriation process, had shaped the
immediate future for NASA's programs by restricting the agency's
budget even further.
As the budget for fiscal 1970 went through
successive parings and the public enthusiasm for space projects
continued to dwindle, Naugle and his associates at NASA
Headquarters grew more and more concerned about the continuing
increases in costs for Viking. On 26 August 1969, Naugle wrote Ed
Cortright and other top Viking managers to review his "personal
[187] philosophy" on the subject. Naugle told the Langley director
that "current indications of an increase over earlier estimates
are of concern; particularly in light of the need to minimize
Federal expenditures." He was especially worried about "cost
overruns which in times of tight budgets, will inevitably result
in disruption to the Viking Project or to other projects." While
the associate administrator recognized the importance of the Mars
mission and while he did not care to "establish arbitrary or
unrealistic cost ceilings" that could also jeopardize the success
of the effort, he did want everyone in the Mars project to ensure
"that Viking [was] tight, efficient, well-engineered, and
well-managed." Every effort had to he made to use existing
technology "to minimize development risks and associated costs."
Naugle recommended a very careful study of the proposed test
program to determine if any paring could be done in that area.
"While we cannot omit necessary development and tests, neither can
we tolerate frills." 54
But the costs for Viking continued to
grow. When first presented to Congress in March 1969, the Viking
price tag had read $364.1 million, an unsound estimate. At the
time, the design of the spacecraft had not been clearly defined.
By August, the expected cost had risen to approximately $606
million, with an additional $50 million for the launch vehicles.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in
October, Naugle admitted that the total cost of Viking would run
about $750 million. Representative Charles A. Mosher of Ohio asked
Naugle what he meant when he said that the $750 million "included
an allowance for a minimum number of changes." The NASA spokesman
responded that past experience with planetary programs indicated
that the agency could expect a 15 to 20 percent increase in the
cost of a given project. "So, in the case of Viking, we are
including in this $750 million estimate about $100 million for
mandatory changes or for trouble that we may get into in the
project." NASA was using $650 million as its target, but Naugle
told the congressmen that "we are only so wise and only so able to
foresee into the future."
Representative Thomas N. Downing of
Virginia expressed his concern about these projections since they
had already grown more than 30 percent to little more than a year.
Naugle noted that the figures presented in 1968 were based on a
still poorly defined spacecraft. "What we have foundŠis that we
underestimated the weight of both the orbiter and the lander." The
additional weight could be translated into more man-hours of
labor, which to turn could be translated into more dollars. On top
of that, the cost of those man-hours had also increased. All the
congressmen were disturbed. Joseph E. Karth, the subcommittee
chairman, pointed out that his group had to sell these cost
escalations on the House floor and it would not be easy. Naugle's
statements that everything was being done to keep costs in line
were not all that reassuring to Karth, who believed that NASA had
"so far failed miserably in that regard." After trying to convince
the subcommittee that the agency had "made a substantial effort to
accurately determine [188] funding requirements before beginning
hardware development," Naugle and his staff renewed their attempts
to control the project managers. Since Congress would not suffer
another project with a huge cost overrun, Don Hearth and others
working for Naugle sought to establish controls over Viking that
would prevent sudden and unexpected expenditures by the engineers
in the field. 55
For all their concern and activity, the
men at NASA Headquarters could not prevent the budget crisis. When
President Nixon signed the fiscal 1970 appropriations bill on 26
November, the total amount - $3.697 billion- was $299 million less
than appropriated the previous year. At the same time, the Bureau
of the Budget was already beginning to chip away at the dollars
the space agency was seeking for 1971. Robert P. Mayo, director of
the Bureau of the Budget, found himself in an awkward position; he
had promised President Nixon a balanced budget, but finding places
where he could reduce expenditures was very difficult. Throughout
the fall of 1969, a stiff debate ran between the space agency and
the budget people, and some of the meetings Paine, Mayo, and their
staffs held were not pleasant.
In light of the Space Task Group's report,
Paine reasoned that he could not recommend a budget of less than
$4.25 billion for NASA. He told Mayo in a letter: "This is a
difficult time. Please do not think me unfeeling toward the many
claimants for your scarce budgetary resources." But Paine thought
that inefficient agencies were being rewarded with increased
budgets while NASA was being penalized. "The people of NASA have
produced outstanding resultsŠwhile reducing costs and personnel
more than any other area of government. . . . .Space offers the
President now a highly productive program and his greatest
leadership opportunity." Unfortunately, the dollars did not go to
the successful. 56
For Viking, the budget cut was
devastating. Before Congress had a chance to consider the budget,
Nixon's administration cut $20 million from the amount requested
for the Mars lander project for 1971. The picture was unpleasant.
With the decline in resources, aggravated by inflation,
Administrator Paine had to reduce expenditures.
57
Table 32
NASA Appropriations, FY
1968-1971 (in billions $)
Budget Item
FY 1968
FY 1969
FY 1970
FY 1971
Total NASA budget
4.5889
3.9952
3.6967
3.3126
Lunar & Planetary
Programs:
.1250
.0923
.1388
.1449
Mariner Mars 71
-
-
.0454
.0296
Viking 73
-
-
.0400
.0350
Mariner Venus Mercury 73
-
-
.0030
.0211
[189] Paine was convinced that the only
alternative to the delay of Viking was its cancellation. At noon
on 31 December 1969, Paine told John Naugle that further analysis
of the federal budget for 1971 by the Bureau of the Budget had
disclosed a $4-billion problem; NASA had been asked to reduce its
request by $225 million. The administrator and his associates
considered three ways to cut dollars-delay Viking from 1973 to
1975; cut the Viking orbiter completely and reduce further the
Office of Manned Space Flight budget; or eliminate manned flights
after the final Skylab flight in 1973. The second and third
options would not provide the necessary reduction, and the Bureau
of the Budget, with President Nixon's agreement, thought that
deferral of Viking was the best step. Naugle spent the rest of
that day working out the details of Viking's slip, taking time out
to note for the record: "1 left at 4:30pm to welcome the New Year
and the new decade in a bleak mood-feeling that two years of
careful planning for Viking had been wiped out in four hours by a
combination of a budgetary error and the article in the
[Washington] Post on Monday, 29 December, by Cohn stating that
scientists at the [American Association for the Advancement of
Science] Meeting had advocated a reduction in the NASA science
program." NASA's space projects were under criticism as part of a
general outcry against federal spending that did not contribute to
the solution of social problems like pollution and feeding the
poor. While scientist Carl Sagan pointed to the Defense Department
as the real source of budget misallocations, other "authorities"
questioned NASA's current proposals to send manned missions to
Mars. Caught in the midst of the antimilitary, antitechnology
furor was Viking. During the last hours of 1969, NASA nearly lost
another opportunity to land on Mars at all. 58
After two weeks of scrambling to
reorganize the space agency's programs, Tom Paine made a public
statement of the changes the 1971 budget would require. Mindful of
recent criticisms, he commented:
We recognize the many important needs and
urgent problems we face hereon earth. America's space achievements
in the l960's have rightly raised hopes that this country and all
mankind can do more to overcome pressing problems of society. The
space program should inspire bolder solutions and suggest new
approachesŠ..NASA will press forward in 1971 at a reduced level,
but in the right direction with the basic ingredients we need for
major achievements in the 1970's and beyond.
While NASA diminished its total
activities, the agency would "not dissipate the strong teams that
sent men to explore the moon and automated spacecraft to observe
the planets." Paine listed the following actions as being
consistent with the requirements of the 1971 budget:
l. We will suspend for an indefinite
period production of the Saturn V launch vehicle after the
completion of Saturn V 515.
2. We will stretch out the Apollo lunar
missions to six-month launch intervals, and defer lunar
expeditions during the [Apollo Applications [190] Program] space
station flights in 1972 [actually flown in 1973, as Skylab
flights.]
3. We will postpone the launch of the
Viking/Mars unmanned lander from 1973 to the next Mars opportunity
in 1975.
With the closing of the Electronics
Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, these actions would
reduce the number of persons (including contractors) working on
NASA projects from 190 000 at the end of fiscal 1970 to about 140
000 at the end of fiscal year 1971. 59
Although Viking survived, there was
considerable confusion at first over what the modified project
would be. Henry Norris and his orbiter teammates officially
learned about the change in plans on 12 January 1970.
60 At the Viking Orbiter Staff meeting in Pasadena the
next day, Norris explained that they had been asked to examine two
alternatives for 1975 Viking missions- the basic 1973
orbiter-lander mission rescheduled for 1975, or a direct-entry
lander mission. This renewed debate over what was called "Options
A and B" brought a sense of deja vu
among the working people.
61
Besides an additional direct dollar cost
of about $102.2 million, JPL learned from the program office at
headquarters, other problems were associated with deferring Viking
to 1975. Steps would have to be taken to bolster morale among the
scientists and engineers. The several false starts on Viking's
predecessors and the cancellation of Voyager had already
discouraged many. As with all complex projects, a strong and
highly motivated team was essential for success, and a limited sum
of money would have to be made available during fiscal 1970 and
1971 to hold the existing team together and permit some meaningful
work on the aspects of the mission that would pose the greatest
technical challenges. The balance of the Viking project would be
budgeted at 1970 levels, but slipped two years. An additional five
percent would be added to compensate for possible
inflation.
William J. Schatz of the JPL Propulsion
Division pointed out two other problems caused by the delay. A
mission in 1975 would require a longer flight time; Mars's
position relative to Earth would require a different trajectory.
Previously, the mission analysis and design people had used
Voyager 1973 work to plan for the 1973 Viking flight. A 1975
launch would require the specialists to start trajectory and
flight path analyses from scratch. New calculations would demand
more manpower and computer time, both of which cost money.
Hardware alterations would also be required. Changes in the
materials used for the propulsion systems might be necessary to
ensure their reliability, and the use of helium as a pressurant
would have to be reevaluated. But beyond these technical
considerations was the economic impact of the stretchout. "Of
prime importance," said Schatz, was the retention "of a qualified
team of engineers at the rocket engine contractor during the
stretchout period." The engine manufacturer, Rocketdyne, a
division of North American Rockwell, was already laying off [191]
personnel, "jeopardizing their ability to support our development
program." Other vendors were either closing their doors or
dropping assembly lines for certain components because of the
general poor condition of the economy. JPL was planning to procure
many items it needed for Viking as soon as possible and place them
in bonded storage until it was ready to assemble the spacecraft.
62
During late January and early February,
NASA Headquarters, Langley, and JPL personnel continued to
evaluate the future course of Viking. After receiving a 28 January
briefing by various Viking staff members, John Naugle decided on
10 February that the agency would pursue its original plan to fly
an orbiter-lander combination. Positive words of support for the
Viking team were put on record by George M. Low, NASA deputy
administrator, and Naugle. Both men knew that the real work had
just begun, but they appreciated the teamwork displayed during the
latest crisis. Low told his colleagues, "Viking holds the highest
priority of any project or program in NASA's Planetary Program.
Viking holds a high priority among all of NASA's programs."
63
The Space Science Board of the National
Academy of Sciences also underscored the value of continuing with
Viking, but the board's endorsement carried some reservations.
Philip Handler, president of the Academy, had suggested to NASA
Administrator Paine in mid-November 1969 that a Space Science
Board review panel be established to evaluate the balance among
the scientific disciplines supported by space agency funds. The
last such review had been held in July 1966 at a time when
National Academy and NASA personnel had assumed that the budget
for space activities would continue to increase. Paine accepted
Handler's offer, but advised him and his colleagues to weigh
carefully the impact of any recommendations to shift money from
one project to another. Any recommendations to cancel programs
that had already gone through an elaborate approval process within
NASA would, in the existing budgetary climate, "almost certainly
lead to the curtailment of the on-going [programs] with little
chance that additional funds [would] become available for [any]
program which the Board feels should be increased."
64
The Space Science Board team that
evaluated NASA's space science activities was known as the Viking
Review Panel, reflecting the amount of money being spent on the
Mars project and the concern generated by the postponement of the
Mars landing. The panel report issued on 24 March 1970 combined
praise and concern. NASA was complimented for its work to defining
a project that accurately reflected the payload recommendations of
the Space Science Board's 1968 study, Planetary Exploration, 1968-1975 . Cost projections, however, caused some division
among the members of the panel. Some believed that the potential
return from the Mars mission was so great that $750 million was
justified. Others expressed concern that "within the extremely
restricted budgetary climate, NASA must set much more limited
goals for itself in order to achieve a balanced scientific
effort." This [192] latter group feared that Viking's high cost
would cause the space agency to lose other "less costly by equally
valuable missions."
Some participants in the review were
worried about the complexity of the Viking science payload, the
most sophisticated payload planned to date, with many new
experiments. A two-year delay of the Viking launch might indeed be
beneficial. "The additional two years can be devoted to an
extensive test of the abilities of the payload, increasing
confidence in [it]."
Since it appeared that future budgets for
space activities would be low, the Viking Review Panel recommended
that "considerably more modest planetary missions" be initiated in
the years to come. Single, complicated, expensive projects like
Viking were too risky-politically and technologically.
Realistically appraising the Viking Review Panel's pronouncement,
John Naugle told Paine, "It is, I think, in view of the talk by
the scientific community these days, an accurate and as good a
statement about Viking as we could expect." 65
*
The membership included Vice
President Spiro T. Agnew, chairman; Secretary of the Air Force
Robert C. Seamans; Administrator Thomas O. Paine; Science Adviser
to the President Lee A. Dubridge; and, as advisers, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Atomic
Energy Commission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, and Bureau of the
Budget Director Robert P. Mayo.
